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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether firms substitute accruals-based 
earnings management with real activities-based earnings management or complement the two 
methods in the MENA region. Further, this paper seeks to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption 
on accruals-based earnings management. To test the research hypotheses, this paper employs a panel 
fixed-effects regression model for a sample of 798 non-financial listed MENA region firms over the 
period 2008-2015, inclusively. The research findings provide evidence that firms complement 
accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management methods rather than substituting one 
earnings management method for the other, which suggests that MENA firms conduct both methods 
concurrently to achieve earnings targets and are not constrained by the relative costs of employing a 
particular method. Furthermore, a significant positive association between GDP growth and 
accruals-based earnings management is found, which provides evidence that economic growth leads 
to a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management behavior in MENA region firms.   
Keywords: Accruals-based earnings management; Real Earnings Management; IFRS Adoption; 
MENA region.) 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has become a significant issue as evidenced by an extensive body of 
literature. There are various definitions of earnings management. For example, Schipper (1989, p.92) 
defines earnings management as the “purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” On the other hand, according to Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p.368), “earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
Opportunistic earnings management occurs when accounting choices are selected in ways that 
are intentionally misleading to stakeholders with regard to the underlying economic performance of 
the firm (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). For example, managers could opportunistically bring forward 
reported earnings from the future to a current accounting period if a bonus award plan exists (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978). 
 There are three broad methods employed by firms to manage earnings: (i) accruals-based 
earnings management which involves altering estimates and accounting policies to change reported 
earnings; (ii) real activities-based earnings management which has direct cash flow consequences such 
as opportunistically reducing research and development expenditures to decrease expenses; and (iii) 
classification shifting-based earnings management which involves shifting the classification of certain 
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items on the income statement. In most studies of earnings management, authors focus on one 
particular method. However, it is unlikely for firms to rely on only one technique for managing 
earnings. There is empirical evidence in the extant literature that firms can employ both accruals-based 
earnings management and real activities-based earnings management methods as complements to 
achieve earnings targets, or substitute one technique for the other based on their relative costs.  
There is a paucity of research into whether firms substitute one earnings management method for 
another or complement the two methods by employing them concurrently, particularly in the case of 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Thus, an objective of this paper is to investigate this 
dynamic. Further, since higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS adoption should be 
expected to curb accruals-based earnings management behaviour and induce firms to shift toward real 
earnings management since real earnings management is not affected by IFRS adoption (Ho et al., 
2015), then it is important to also investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings 
management. The MENA region provides a unique setting to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption 
on accruals-based earnings management since not all MENA region countries report under IFRS. Table 
1 summarizes the adoption status of the MENA countries included in the study sample.  
Table 1. IFRS Adoption Status of MENA Region Countries 
Country Status of IFRS Adoption Details for IFRS Adoption 
Bahrain Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public companies 
and required or permitted for foreign companies. 
Egypt Not adopted 
IFRS is required or permitted for foreign 
companies only. Domestic companies report 
under local standards.  
Jordan Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic and foreign 
companies. 
Kuwait Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public 
companies. 
Oman Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public companies 
and is under consideration for SMEs.  
Qatar Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public companies 
and is required or permitted for SMEs. 
Saudi Arabia Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public companies 
and the adoption for SMEs is in progress. 
Tunisia Not adopted IFRS is not permitted. 
United Arab Emirates Adopted 
IFRS is required for all domestic public companies 
and required or permitted for SMEs. 
Note. This table presents details for the IFRS adoption status for the MENA region countries included 
in the study sample. 
As shown in the Table 1, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabi, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Jordan report under IFRS while Egypt and Tunisia report under local standards. Therefore, this 
paper seeks to address two research questions: (i) what is the impact of IFRS adoption on accruals-
based earnings management for MENA firms? and (ii) are earnings management methods used as 
substitutes or complements by firms? By addressing these research questions, this paper provides 
significant contributions to the earnings management literature.  
By examining whether earnings management methods are used as complements or substitutes, 
this paper expands the earnings management literature since the majority of studies focus on accruals-
based or real activities-based earnings management methods in isolation and do not consider whether 
these methods are employed as substitutes or complements by managers, which is particularly the 
case for research in the MENA region. However, this is of particular importance to regulators since it 
is essential to understand whether MENA firms are constrained in terms of employing accruals-based 
earnings management and thus shift toward real earnings management, or are able to employ both 
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concurrently. In addition, by investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings 
management, this paper provides a contribution to the extant literature for the MENA region in 
particular since IFRS adoption should be expected to curb accruals-based earnings management 
behaviour, potentially inducing firms to shift toward real activities-based earnings management.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature and the development of hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research methodology adopted 
in this paper. In Section 4, the discussion of results is presented. Section 5 provides a conclusion, 
recommendations for future research, and discusses the research limitations.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
There is evidence in the extant literature that firms can employ both earnings management 
methods as complements to achieve earnings targets. On the other hand, evidence also shows that if 
accruals-based earnings management is constrained, managers can substitute it for real earnings 
management. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that a firm’s choice of an earnings management 
technique is a function of the costs of engaging in accruals-based earnings management as well as the 
capacity to do so. The costs associated with employing accruals-based earnings management include 
the scrutiny of regulators and auditors, and potential litigation penalties. Similarly, Doukakis (2014) 
argues that although accounting choices are subject to auditor scrutiny, real operating decisions are 
less subject to this scrutiny. According to Zhu et al. (2015), real earnings management is less likely to 
be constrained and discovered by auditors and regulators since operational decisions are more 
inherently under the expertise and discretion of management. They further argue that firms which 
employed a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management in previous years are likely to 
alternate to real earnings management in current and future periods as a result of the constraints of 
accruals-based earnings management. Further, Zang (2012) argues that firms encounter different 
constraints for both methods and provides evidence that the trade-off decision is dependent upon the 
relative costs of employing the two strategies. She explains that managers will utilize one earnings 
management technique when the other method is constrained.  
Most empirical studies of the substitutability of earnings management methods find evidence of 
a substitution effect. In her study of US firms, Zang (2012) finds evidence of firms substituting the two 
methods. In other studies of US firms, Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) and Cohen et al. (2008) 
also find consistent evidence. Similarly, Zhu et al. (2015) investigate Chinese reverse merger firms and 
find that firms substitute the two methods. Consistent with this finding, Doukakis (2014) investigates 
the effect of obligatory IFRS adoption on both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management for 22 European countries, and also finds evidence of a substitution effect. In a study of 
Tunisian firms, Hamza and Bannouri (2015) find that following the implementation of the 2005 
Financial System Reform act, Tunisian managers engaged in real earnings management through sales 
manipulation. The authors therefore suggest that real earnings management is employed by Tunisian 
firms in a tightened regulatory environment. However, in a more recent study of Tunisian firms, 
Hamza and Kortas (2019) find evidence of a complementary relationship between accruals-based and 
real activities-based earnings management methods. The authors argue that Tunisian firms do not face 
greater scrutiny from regulators and thus employ both methods concurrently to achieve earnings 
targets. However, they also find evidence of a substitution effect when income taxation becomes the 
main incentive for earnings management practices. In this case, Tunisian firms substitute accruals-
based earnings management with real earnings management. Thus, their study finds evidence of both 
a substitutability of earnings management methods, and a complementary relationship between the 
two methods. In a study of Thai firms, Khunkaew and Qingxiang (2019) find evidence that firms 
substitute earnings management methods.           
In contrast to the research findings of a substitution effect, however, Kuo et al. (2014) find that 
Chinese firms display a long-term positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management 
and real activities-based earnings management methods, which suggests that the two methods can 
also be employed to supplement each other in order to achieve earnings targets. Consistent with this, 
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Ismail (2017) studies Egyptian firms and finds that they employ both earnings management methods 
concurrently. He argues that firms complement the two techniques to achieve earnings targets. 
However, since the majority of studies find a substitution effect, the following hypothesis is stated.  
 
H1: Firms use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management methods as substitutes.  
 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that clearer accounting rules and stricter accounting 
standards result in less earnings management and a higher quality of earnings. Consistent with this 
argument, Ho et al. (2015) argue that IFRS adoption is likely to curb accruals-based earnings 
management since more principle-based accounting standards decrease the opportunistic 
interpretation of complex rules and force firms to comply with the intent of the standards. Further, the 
costs of conducting accruals-based earnings management can be expected to rise as a result of 
heightened outside scrutiny from the audit reform and other regulations. 
Further, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that IFRS adoption increases transparency and reduces agency 
costs, thereby curbing earnings management. They find a negative relationship between IFRS adoption 
and both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management for 44 countries. Ho et al. 
(2015) examine the impact of IFRS adoption upon accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management in Chinese firms and argue that higher quality accounting standards associated with 
IFRS and or simultaneous changes in the governance regimes introduced as part of the IFRS mandate 
curb accruals-based earnings management behaviour. However, real earnings management becomes 
easier to conduct since it is not affected by IFRS. Thus, if there is a trade-off of one earnings 
management method for another, firms are likely to trade off upward accruals-based earnings 
management for real earnings management. They find that Chinese firms are less likely to engage in 
accruals-based earnings management following the adoption of IFRS, and instead shift to real earnings 
management. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated.  
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management and IFRS adoption. 
3. Data and Methods  
3.1. Data 
This research employs secondary data drawn from the Thompson Reuters Datastream financial 
database for 798 non-financial MENA listed firms. The countries included in the sample are Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The sample 
selected for the study covers the period 2008-2015, inclusively. This study period spans multiple 
economic cycles and political events. At the time of data collection, there was no available data for this 
sample of countries prior to the year 2008 or past the year 2015. Financial firms are excluded from the 
study.  
The sample selected includes firms across the following industries: energy, materials, industrials, 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, healthcare, real estate, information technology, mobile 
telecommunications, and utilities. Firm-years that lack the necessary data to compute the dependent 
or independent variables are excluded from the study. Further, outliers are detected and removed. If 
an observation is larger than three standard deviations of the sample distribution, it is considered an 
outlier. After removing firm-years that lack the necessary data to compute the variables, and after 
removing outliers, this research examines a total number of 2,740 firm-year observations.     
3.2. Accruals-Based Earnings Management Dependent Variable 
 This research employs the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to compute 
discretionary accruals to proxy for accruals-based earnings management. The Modified Jones Model 
is proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) as a development of the original model proposed by Jones (1991). 
First, total accruals are computed using the cash flow statement approach as shown in Equation 1.  
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𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 − 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠   (1) 
Next, firm specific parameters are obtained from Equation 2 that follows.   
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2  [
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ] +  𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡 
  (2) 
where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = total accruals in year t. 𝜀𝑡 is the residual, which represents the firm-specific discretionary 
portion of total accruals.  
𝐴𝑡−1 = total assets at the end of year t-1;  
α, α2, and α3 are the firm-specific parameters; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t–1; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  = gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t. 
Equation 3 is then computed to derive the nondiscretionary portion of total accruals as follows.  
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2  [
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ] + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ )   (3) 
where:  
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = the nondiscretionary portion of total accruals.  
The models are estimated at the cross-section for each industry member for at least eight 
observations. Discretionary accruals are then computed as the difference between total accruals scaled 
by lagged total assets and nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as follows.  
𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡   (4) 
3.3. Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Proxy  
To proxy for real earnings management, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, and abnormal cash flows are employed. Real earnings management can be conducted 
by means of reducing the cost of goods sold through the overproduction of inventory and by means 
of reducing discretionary expenditures, including research and development (R&D), advertising, and 
selling, general, and administrative expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). The abnormal 
level of production costs is used to measure the reduction in the cost of goods sold thorough the 
overproduction of inventory since the fixed cost per unit declines with an increasing volume of 
production (Kuo et al., 2014), while the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is used to 
measure the reduction in discretionary expenditures. The following model estimates the normal level 
production costs. The estimated residual from this equation is the abnormal level of production costs.  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4 (
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡  
  (5) 
 
where:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡  = the sum of cost of goods sold in year t and the change in inventory from t-1 to t; 
𝐴𝑡−1 = the total assets in year t-1;  
𝑆𝑡 = net sales in year t;  
And ∆𝑆𝑡−1 = the change in net sales from year t-2 to t-1.  
Equation 5 is estimated at the cross-section for each industry member for at least eight 
observations. The greater the amount of inventory overproduction, the higher the residual, and thus 
the greater is the increase in reported earnings through the reduction in the cost of goods sold. The 
normal level of discretionary expenditures is estimated as follows.  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡              
  (6) 
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where:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡 = discretionary expenditures (the sum of selling, general, and administrative expenditures) 
in year t;  
𝑆𝑡−1 = the net sales of the previous year. 
 
The abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is measured as the estimated residual from the 
regression. Equation 6 is estimated at the cross-section for each industry member for at least eight 
observations. In addition to this, a third real activities-based earnings management model is employed 
consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Roychowdhury (2006), which models cash flow from 
operations and expresses it as a linear function of sales and the change in sales in the current year. The 
model is estimated as follows.  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼1 (1 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (𝑆𝑡 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (∆𝑆𝑡 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡    
  (7) 
where:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂 = the cash flows from operating activities in year t.  
 
The normal level of cash flows from operations is computed using the estimated coefficients from 
Equation 7 and this variable is then subtracted from the actual cash flows from operations to derive 
the abnormal cash flows from operations. Equation 7 is estimated at the cross-section for each industry 
member for at least eight observations. Rather than employing the three proxies separately, an 
aggregate proxy for real activities-based earnings management is computed to capture the total impact 
of real earnings management, consistent with Kuo et al. (2014), as follows.  
𝑅𝑀 = −𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 −
𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠       
  (8) 
Consistent with Kuo et al., abnormal cash flows from operations are multiplied by -1 and then 
abnormal production costs are added to it. By doing so, higher levels of RM indicate higher levels of 
real earnings management activities, as suggested by Zang (2012). Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures are added to abnormal cash flows from operations after multiplying abnormal cash flows 
from operations by -1 so that the larger the value of this aggregate proxy, the higher the utilization of 
sales manipulation as well as reductions in discretionary expenditures for managing earnings as 
suggested by Kuo et al. (2014).  
3.4. Model Specification 
This research tests whether accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
methods are used by MENA firms as substitutes or complements, and also investigates the impact of 
IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings management by employing the following panel regression 
model.  
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (9) 
where: 
DA = discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; RM corresponds to the 
aggregate real earnings management proxy variable; SIZE = firm size measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV = leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets; GROWTH = 
growth opportunities measured as the market price per share divided by the book value per share; 
DPR = the dividend payout ratio measured as the dividend per share divided by earnings per share; 
IFRS = IFRS adoption which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports its financial 
statements under IFRS and 0 otherwise; and GDP = the GDP growth rate;  
In this model, the real earnings management proxy is regressed against discretionary accruals to 
identify whether firms employ both methods concurrently or substitute one for the other. A positive 
relationship between discretionary accruals and the real earnings management proxy would indicate 
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that firms employ both methods as complements. In contrast, a negative association would indicate 
that firms substitute accruals-based earnings management with real earnings management. Firm size, 
leverage, growth opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and the GDP growth rate are included as 
control variables since they may impact upon accruals-based earnings management.   
Firm size is included as a control variable in this study since large firms incur relatively high 
reputation costs if the credibility of financial information disclosed is compromised compared to 
smaller firms, and enjoy the benefits of receiving better audit services which likely diminishes their 
earnings management capability (Lemma et al., 2013). Further, Kuo et al. (2014) argue that larger firms 
face greater scrutiny by auditors and regulators compared with small, rapidly growing firms whose 
business activities cannot be so easily observed. Leverage is controlled for in this study since high 
leveraged firms may tend toward earnings management in order to prevent breaches of debt covenants 
(Lemma et al., 2013). In contrast, higher leverage may reduce opportunistic earnings management 
behaviour since firms that employ debt are often subject to lender-imposed spending restrictions 
(Jelinek, 2007). Since growing firms might refrain from engaging in earnings management behaviour 
since these firms are likely to be under close scrutiny by outsiders which would make it harder to 
manipulate earnings opportunistically (Lemma et al., 2013), growth opportunities is included as a 
control variable. The dividend payout ratio is included as a control variable since earnings 
management is often conducted to maintain a desired payout ratio or to meet certain dividend 
thresholds since the payout ratio is considered to be a signal of the future growth prospects of a firm 
(Miller and Rock, 1985). Filip and Raffournier (2014) argue that a firm’s propensity to manipulate 
earnings is impacted by dramatic changes in the economic environment of the firm. Therefore, the 
GDP growth rate is included as a control variable in this study.  
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical models. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown for the dependent and 
independent variables.   
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 




DA 0.004 -0.000 0.140 -0.747 0.796 
RM -0.211 -0.172 0.334 -1.862 1.404 
SIZE 12.628 12.507 2.407 6.439 19.505 
LEV 0.197 0.157 0.180 0.000 0.806 
GROWTH 1.936 1.466 1.826 0.110 25.025 
DPR 37.278 39.60 34.356 0.000 100 
GDP 3.719 3.510 3.059 -5.242 13.375 
Note. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the models. The mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown for the dependent and 
independent variables. DA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; 
RM refers to the aggregate real earnings management proxy computed by aggregating abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and abnormal cash flows; SIZE refers to firm 
size measured using the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GROWTH refers to growth opportunities measured using the price-book ratio; 
DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as dividends per share divided by earnings per 
share; and GDP refers to the GDP growth rate. 
As shown in Table 2, the standard deviation of RM is higher than that of DA which indicates 
higher volatility for real earnings management compared with accruals-based earnings management 
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for MENA firms. The mean value for RM is higher than DA which suggests that MENA firms engage 
in a greater degree of real earnings management compared with accruals-based earnings management 
on average. MENA firms rely on 19.7% debt financing on average with a maximum debt ratio of 
around 80%. Further, MENA firms are characterized by a 37.28% dividend payout ratio on average.  
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for the variables included in the empirical models 
to analyse the correlations between the dependent and independent variables.   
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 DA RM SIZE LEV GROWTH DPR GDP 
DA 1       
RM .253** 1      
SIZE .058** .064** 1     
LEV -.012 .142** .258** 1    
GROWTH -.010 -.160** .103** .001 1   
DPR .092** -.215** .113** -.235** .105** 1  
GDP 047* -.051** .056** .021 .054** .042* 1 
Note. This table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for the variables included in the models. DA 
refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; RM refers to the aggregate 
real earnings management proxy computed by aggregating abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary expenditures, and abnormal cash flows; SIZE refers to firm size measured using the 
natural logarithm of total assets; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; 
GROWTH refers to growth opportunities measured using the price-book ratio; DPR refers to the 
dividend payout ratio measured as dividends per share divided by earnings per share; and GDP refers 
to the GDP growth rate. ** and * refer to the significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
As shown in Table 3, DA and the RM are significantly positively correlated at the 1% level. This 
potentially indicates that MENA firms complement the two earnings management methods rather 
than substituting one method for the other. However, in the absence of regression results, this is only 
indicative.  
Firm size and the dividend payout ratio are significantly positively correlated with discretionary 
accruals at the 1% level. GDP growth is shown to be significantly positively correlated with 
discretionary accruals at the 5% level. This indicates that larger firms, firms which are characterized 
by higher dividend payout ratios, and growth in GDP are correlated with a greater degree of accruals-
based earnings management behaviour. Firm size and leverage are found to be significantly positively 
correlated with the real earnings management proxy variable at the 1% level, while growth 
opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and GDP growth are found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with RM at the 1% level, suggesting that larger firms and higher leveraged firms may 
engage in a greater degree of real earnings management, while greater GDP growth rates, firms 
characterized by higher growth opportunities, and higher dividend payout ratios may exhibit a lower 
tendency to engage in real earnings management.  
4.3. Regression Results  
The Hausman Test is computed to identify whether a panel fixed-effects or random-effects 
regression should be employed. The results show that a fixed-effects regression should be employed 
in the empirical model of this paper. Table 4 presents the Panel Fixed-Effects regression results of the 
empirical model which tests whether earnings management methods are employed by firms as 
substitutes or complements and investigates the effect of IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings 
management. The maximum and mean variance inflation factor (VIF) values are also included and 
indicate that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity across the model variables.  
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Constant -0.171  
 (-0.64)  
RM 0.236 - 
 (10.97)***  
SIZE 0.018  
 (0.87)  
LEV 0.038  
 (0.71)  
GROWTH -0.002  
 (-0.59)  
DPR 0.000  
 (1.74)*  
IFRS -0.043 - 
 (-0.98)  
GDP 0.002  
 (3.09)***  
R Squared 0.2109  
Model Significance 0.000  
Observations 2,740  
Maximum VIF 1.52  
Mean VIF 1.22  
Note. This table presents the panel fixed-effects regression results for the empirical model. The t-
statistics are shown between brackets and ***, **, and * refer to the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are used. RM refers to the 
aggregate real earnings management proxy computed by aggregating abnormal production costs, 
abnormal discretionary expenditures, and abnormal cash flows; SIZE refers to firm size measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; 
GROWTH refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; DPR refers to the dividend 
payout ratio measured as dividend per share divided by earnings per share; IFRS refers to a dummy 
variable for the IFRS adoption status; and GDP refers to the GDP growth rate. 
To test Hypothesis H1 which states that firms use accruals-based and real activities-based 
earnings management methods as substitutes, the association between discretionary accruals and the 
real earnings management proxy variable is examined. Table 4 shows that the real earnings 
management proxy variable is significantly positively associated with discretionary accruals at the 1% 
level. The significant positive coefficient provides evidence that MENA firms employ both accruals-
based earnings management and real earnings management methods as complements, which is likely 
conducted to achieve earnings targets. Thus, MENA firms do not trade off one earnings management 
method for the other based on their relative costs, and this evidence further shows that accruals-based 
earnings management may not be difficult to employ in MENA firms and thus it is not necessary for 
firms to switch to real earnings management since it is more difficult to detect. It is possible that MENA 
firms are not heavily scrutinized by analysts and regulators, and thus are capable of employing both 
methods concurrently. This result is of particular importance to regulators and policy makers who 
should be aware that accruals-based earnings management in MENA firms is not constrained and it is 
therefore possible for firms to engage in both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management methods simultaneously. 
This finding provides support for the research findings of Hamza and Kortas (2019) for Tunisian 
firms, Ismail (2017) for Egyptian firms, and Kuo et al. (2014) for Chinese firms. However, a positive 
coefficient contrasts with the research findings of Zang (2012), Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017), 
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and Cohen et al. (2008) who investigate US firms, as well as Zhu et al. (2015) and Doukakis (2014) in 
an examination of Chinese firms and 22 European countries, respectively. Further, this finding does 
not provide support for hypothesis H1. IFRS adoption is found to be an insignificant determinant of 
discretionary accruals and thus Hypothesis H2 is not supported. 
Regarding the control variables, only GDP growth is found to be a significant determinant of 
discretionary accruals. The coefficient is significant and positive at the 1% level which provides 
evidence that economic growth leads to a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management 
behaviour in MENA firms. This may be due to firms engaging in earnings management to avoid 
lagging behind the economy’s growth rate.  
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Conclusion 
This study addresses two research questions: (i) are earnings management methods used as 
substitutes or complements by firms? and (ii) what is the impact of IFRS adoption on accruals-based 
earnings management? The research findings provide evidence that MENA firms employ both 
accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management methods concurrently, which is 
likely conducted to achieve earnings targets. Therefore, MENA firms do not substitute the two 
methods and instead employ both methods as complements. Accruals-based earnings management is 
evidently not constrained within MENA firms. It is possible that MENA firms are not scrutinized 
heavily by regulators and analysts and therefore firms are capable of complementing earnings 
management methods as suggested by Hamza and Kortas (2019) who argue that Tunisian firms do 
not face significant scrutiny from regulators and thus employ both methods concurrently to achieve 
earnings targets. Thus, firms do not need to substitute one method for the other due to the relative 
costs and instead employ both simultaneously.   
Further, GDP growth is found to be a significant determinant of accruals-based earnings 
management. Economic growth is associated with a greater degree of accruals-based earnings 
management in MENA firms. This may be due to firms managing earnings to avoid lagging behind 
the economy’s growth rate.  
The results presented in this study have important implications for regulators, policy makers, and 
auditors. Auditors, regulators, and policy makers should be aware that greater economic growth leads 
to a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management behaviour. Thus, during periods of 
economic growth, it is important to be more alert in terms of detecting earnings management 
behaviour. Further, firms employ both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
methods concurrently. Thus, auditors and regulators should not focus on mitigating the use of a 
particular method and should pay particular attention to both methods.  
5.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
Future research could examine the classification shifting-based earnings management method 
and investigate whether it is employed by firms as a substitute or complement to the accruals-based 
and real activities-based earnings management methods. Additional country-level variables could be 
tested as well. Particularly, future research could investigate the potential impact of financial 
development on earnings management.   
5.3. Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that corporate governance variables are not included in the 
empirical model since there was no available data for such variables. However, such variables could 
have an impact upon earnings management behaviour and consequently whether firms substitute or 
complement earnings management methods. In addition, although the MENA region includes 
roughly nineteen countries, the study sample is restricted to only nine countries due to the availability 
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of data at the time of writing. Further, due to missing data values necessary to compute the dependent 
variable for some of the MENA countries, the study sample is restricted to nine countries  
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